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VALENTINE v. ON TARGET, INC.: IT IS TIME TO HOLD GUN
DEALERS ACCOUNTABLE FOR THE NEGLIGENT
STORAGE OF FIREARMS
In Valentine v. On Target, Inc.,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
considered what duty, if any, a retail gun store owner owes to third
parties to exercise reasonable care in the display and sale of handguns
in order to prevent theft and subsequent criminal misuse of those
handguns.2 Analyzing the doctrine of tort duty, the court concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to allege any facts that showed that the
defendant gun store could have foreseen that handguns from its in-
ventory would be stolen and subsequently used in a criminal act.3
With the caveat that its holding should be confined to the well-
pleaded facts of this case,4 the court held that a gun store owner does
not owe a duty "to third parties to exercise reasonable care in the
display and sale of handguns to prevent the theft and the illegal use of
the handguns by others against third parties."5 Although this holding
is appropriate in the narrow context of this case, the majority pro-
vided dicta which incorrectly suggests that victims of handgun vio-
lence are barred from suing gun retailers for their negligent storage
of handguns.6 In a time of escalating violence perpetrated with illegal
firearms, public policy demands that the law recognize a duty on the
part of handgun merchants to exercise reasonable care in conducting
their business. 7 Drawing on established common law principles, this
Note will propose a framework for recognizing a duty on the part of
1. 353 Md. 544, 727 A.2d 947 (1999).
2. Id. at 546-47, 727 A.2d at 948.
3. Id. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.
4. Id. at 547, 727 A.2d at 948.
5. Id. at 546-47, 727 A.2d at 948.
6. See id. at 558, 727 A.2d at 954 (Raker, J., concurring) (warning that the majority
opinion may be "misunderstood as declaring victims of handgun violence in Maryland to
be barred from suing retail handgun merchants for their negligent handling of their hand-
gun inventory"). In particular, Judge Raker expressed concern regarding the majority's
statement that, "[i]f we would hold today that gun merchants owe an indefinite duty to the
general public effectively we would be regulating the merchants." Id. (quoting Valentine,
353 Md. at 556, 727 A.2d at 953).
7. See id. at 567, 727 A.2d at 958 ("I believe that the policy concerns cry out loudly in
favor of recognizing a duty to the foreseeable plaintiff on the part of retail handgun sellers
to exercise reasonable care in conducting their business so as to avoid the theft and subse-
quent criminal misuse of handguns."); cf 18 U.S.C. § 9 22(q) (1) (West 2000) ("The Con-
gress finds and declares that-(A) crime, particularly crime involving drugs and guns, is a
pervasive, nationwide problem ....").
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retail gun stores to safeguard dangerous instrumentalities, and for de-
fining a cause of action for breaches of that duty.
I. THE CASE
In July 1993, Edward McLeod and an unidentified companion
stole several handguns from On Target, Inc., a firearms retailer in
Anne Arundel County, Maryland.8 There are no facts in the record
which describe the circumstances of the theft, nor does the record
provide any details about the precautions taken by On Target to pre-
vent theft in general. 9 Two months later, Joanne Valentine was fatally
shot by an unknown assailant outside her Anne Arundel County
home. 0 The gun used to murder her was one of the guns that had
been stolen from On Target in July."1 Vincent Valentine ("Plaintiff')
brought a wrongful death suit against On Target in the Circuit Court
for Anne Arundel County, on behalf of Joanne Valentine's estate,
himself as surviving spouse, and their children.' 2 He sought damages
for negligence, asserting that On Target owed a duty to "'Joanne Val-
entine and to all other persons situate in or near Anne Arundel
County, to exercise reasonable care in the display of handguns held
out to the public for sale to prevent theft and illegal use of the
handguns.'
8. Valentine, 353 Md. at 547, 727 A.2d at 948.
9. See id. ("[T]he complaint does not describe how the handguns were displayed or
what could have been done by [the defendant's] agents to prevent the theft."); Valentine v.
On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 682, 686 A.2d 636, 637 (1996) ("The complaint gives
no details with respect to how McLeod and his confederate managed to steal the guns.").
However, at oral argument on the defendant's motion to dismiss, On Target's counsel
provided some additional information about the circumstances of the theft:
[T]wo young men came into the store ... there were two guns in a display case
that was under lock and key .... [W]hile one of these particular gentlemen
distracted the one attendant in the store the other one came, broke the lock on
the display case, took two guns out, thereafter both left. The man ... working at
that time was not aware that anything had been taken. When he did become
aware sometime thereafter he immediately notified the police.
Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 2, E39, Valentine (No. 95-22401.OC).
10. Valentine, 353 Md. at 547, 727 A.2d at 948.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. In the complaint, Plaintiff asserted that On Target had breached its alleged
duty by
failing to (1) properly train and supervise its employees to prevent theft of the
handguns, (2) properly supervise customers at a time when the store was open to
members of the general public for the sale of handguns, (3) adequately keep
watch over the handguns and install adequate security devices to deter, or detect,
the theft of handguns, (4) properly secure the handguns and store them in a
display case to safeguard them from theft, (5) interrupt the theft of the hand-
guns, (6) notice the theft of the handguns and notify law enforcement authorities
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On Target filed a motion to dismiss based on Plaintiffs failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 4 The motion was
granted, and Plaintiff noted a timely appeal to the Court of Special
Appeals. 5 The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the dismissal, hold-
ing that on the record before it, On Target did not owe a duty to the
decedent, and even if On Target had breached some duty to prevent
theft, it was not the proximate cause of Joanne Valentine's death.' 6
The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to consider "what, if any, tort
duty a gun store owner owes to third parties to exercise reasonable
care in the display and sale of handguns to prevent the theft and the
illegal use of the handguns by others against third parties."' 7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
In Maryland, it is a well-established rule that to maintain a negli-
gence action, the plaintiff must allege in the complaint four elements:
that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the defendant
breached that duty, that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and
that the defendant's breach of duty was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury or loss. 8
A. Specificity in Maryland Pleading
Maryland rules of procedure require that a complaint "contain a
clear statement of the facts necessary to constitute a cause of action." a"
The complexity of the case will determine what facts are necessary-
simple factual situations may require only minimal allegations, while
complex factual situations will require substantially more. 20 In partic-
ular, when the defendant's duty is not apparent, the plaintiff will be
required to plead with specificity the basis for the alleged duty.2' A
in a timely fashion, and (7) fail[ing] to warn the community of the theft of the
handguns in a timely fashion.
Id. at 547-48, 727 A.2d at 948.
14. Id. at 548, 727 A.2d at 949.
15. See id.
16. Valentine v. On Target, 112 Md. App. 679, 693, 686 A.2d 636, 643 (1996).
17. Valentine, 353 Md. at 546-47, 727 A.2d at 948.
18. Id. at 549, 727 A.2d at 949 (quoting BG & E v. Lane, 338 Md. 34, 43, 656 A.2d 307,
311 (1995) (citing Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994))).
19. MD. R. 2-305.
20. Read Drug & Chem. Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 413, 243 A.2d 548, 553
(1968).
21. Id. (quotingJoseph 0. Kaiser, Pleading Negligence in Maryland-Res Ipsa Loquitur as a
Rule of Pleading, 11 MD. L. REv. 102, 103-04 (1950)).
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plaintiff is not permitted to assert only conclusory allegations in a
complaint for negligence.22
Maryland has a long tradition of favoring specificity in pleading.
In the 1903 case Jeter v. Schwind Quarry Co.,23 the Court of Appeals
explained that it is essential that pleadings contain sufficient facts to
provide the court with a basis for legal conclusions, and to allow the
opposing party to prepare a defense.24 In Jeter, a negligence case, the
plaintiff failed to plead the specific duty neglected by the defendant,
instead charging the defendant with general misconduct.25 The court
sustained the defendant's demurrer, finding that the plaintiff's aver-
ments of the defendant's tortious conduct were "'too general and in-
definite"' to state a claim for which the law would provide relief.26
Today, Maryland Rule 2-322(b) (2) permits defendants to present
a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a
claim upon which relief can be granted.27 An action will be dismissed
when the complaint fails to state a valid legal claim even if the factual
allegations in the complaint are proven to be true.28 In considering a
motion to dismiss, the court must assume the truth of all well-pleaded
facts and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn from those
facts. 29 The motion to dismiss must be denied when the facts, if
proven, would entitle the plaintiff to relief.30 In reviewing a disposi-
22. Valentine, 353 Md. at 549, 727 A.2d at 949 (citing BG & E , 338 Md. at 43, 656 A.2d
at 311).
23. 97 Md. 696, 55 A. 366 (1903).
24. Id. at 698, 55 A. at 367 (quoting JOHN PRENTISS POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE IN
COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 562 (3d ed. 1897)).
25. Id. at 699, 55 A. at 367.
26. Id. (quoting Gent v. Cole, 38 Md. 110, 113 (1873)).
27. Maryland Rule 2-322(b) (2) states in relevant part: "The following defenses may be
made by motion to dismiss filed before the answer, if an answer is required: ... (2) failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted .... The motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim is the modern equivalent of the demurrer. Ungar v. State, 63 Md. App. 472,
479 & n.6, 492 A.2d 1336, 1340 & n.6 (1985) (finding that "[t]he trial court properly ruled
on the... demurrer" because it would make "little practical difference" whether the trial
court applied the demurrer or the motion to dismiss as the two rules function in the same
manner).
28. Valentine, 353 Md. at 548, 727 A.2d at 949 (citing Faya v. Almaraz, 329 Md. 435, 443,
620 A.2d 327, 331 (1993)).
29. Id.; Hrehorovich v. Harbor Hosp. Ctr., Inc., 93 Md. App. 772, 781, 614 A.2d 1021,
1026 (1992) (citing Sharrow v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 306 Md. 754, 768, 511 A.2d
492, 499-500 (1986)).
30. Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 99 Md. App. 646, 653, 639 A.2d 147, 150-51
(1994) (citing Stone v. Chicago Title Ins. Co., 330 Md. 329, 624 A.2d 496 (1993); MacGill
v. Blue Cross of Md., Inc., 77 Md. App. 613, 551 A.2d 501 (1989)). However, "when a trial
court grants a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, the court has the discretionary authority to grant the plaintiff leave to amend the
complaint to cure any defects." Davis v. DiPino, 337 Md. 642, 648, 655 A.2d 401, 404
444
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tion by motion to dismiss, an appellate court must be guided by the
same standard as a lower court.3"
B. The Negligence Cause of Action and the Concept of "Duty"
Compared to age-old crimes like larceny and murder that are pri-
marily concerned with punishing overt acts, negligence is a relatively
young legal concept.32 It was barely recognized as a tort action prior
to the early nineteenth century and was largely a product of the Indus-
trial Revolution." Following the national trend in the late 1800s, Ma-
ryland law began to recognize a cause of action in tort for "'wrongful
acts, neglect or default."' 4 Today, Maryland law requires the typical
elements to maintain an action in negligence-duty, breach, injury,
and causation. 5
(1995) (citing MD. R. 2-322(c)); see also G & H Clearing & Landscaping v. Whitworth, 66
Md. App. 348, 356 n.5, 503 A.2d 1379, 1383 n.5 (1986) ("Although Md. Rule 2-322 is not
entirely clear on the point, it would seem that leave to amend may, and in some instances
should, be extended even where a pure motion to dismiss is granted."); MD. R. 2-341 (c)
("Amendments shall be freely allowed when justice so permits.").
31. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Miles & Stockbridge, 95 Md. App. 145, 186, 620 A.2d 356,
376 (1993) (applying the same appellate standard of review for dispositions by motion to
dismiss as that which is used by trial courts-that is, the assumption of the truth of all well-
pleaded facts and all inferences reasonably drawn from them (quoting Sharrow, 306 Md. at
768, 511 A.2d at 500)).
32. Prosser and Keeton provide some insight into the history of negligence:
Since the early law found its hands full in dealing with the more serious forms of
misbehavior, it was natural that the early cases should be concerned almost exclu-
sively with positive acts, rather than with omissions to act ....
During the first half of the nineteenth century, negligence began to gain
recognition as a separate and independent basis of tort liability. Its rise coincided
in a marked degree with the Industrial Revolution ....
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 28, at 161 (5th ed.
1984).
33. Id.
34. Balt. & Ohio R.R. v. State, 29 Md. 460, 464 (1868). In Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,
the court relied on an 1860 statute, Article 65 of the Code of Public General Laws, which
authorized actions based on neglect or default. Id. The statute was repealed in 1973 as a
part of Maryland's effort to streamline procedure, but it serves as a useful milestone by
which to date the state's adoption of a negligence-based doctrine. Elaborating on the lan-
guage of the statute, the court explained in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad that "[p] ersons and
corporations are accountable for all damage occasioned by any neglect where the other
party is not in fault, or has not contributed to his own injury." Id. The negligence cause of
action quickly developed later in the nineteenth century. See, e.g., Maenner v. Carroll, 46
Md. 193, 212 (1877) ("To constitute a good cause of action, in a case of [negligence],
there should be stated a right on the part of the plaintiff, a duty on the part of the defend-
ants in respect to that right, and a breach of that duty by the defendants, whereby the
plaintiff has suffered injury.").
35. See supra text accompanying note 18 (stating the elements of a prima facie negli-
gence case).
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Determining the existence of a legal duty requires an analysis of
"foreseeability. ''1 6 Judge Benjamin Cardozo's famous majority opin-
ion in the 1928 case Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. 7 is arguably
the watershed opinion on the issue of foreseeability. Writing for the
Court of Appeals of New York, Judge Cardozo explained that tort duty
is defined by perceptible risk-a defendant will only owe a duty to
other parties within "the range of apprehension."38 In other words, a
defendant will only owe a duty to guard against foreseeable harm to
foreseeable plaintiffs.
The Maryland doctrine governing tort duty mirrors Judge Car-
dozo's logic in Palsgraf39 In Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co.,4" the Court of
Appeals considered what duty a former occupier of land owes to a
subsequent occupant to prevent the land from becoming contami-
nated with toxic chemicals.4' The court declared that it is not enough
for the plaintiff to merely show that he was harmed by the defendant's
conduct; rather, he must show that the defendant owed the plaintiff a
duty to guard against that harm.42 To determine the existence of a
duty, the court explained, the "foreseeability of harm" test is used.4"
This test serves the important policy of limiting duty to avoid liability
for unreasonably remote consequences, a policy which traces its roots
to Judge Cardozo's Palsgraf opinion.44
36. See Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994). The Court
of Special Appeals pointed out in its Valentine opinion that foreseeability is common to
both duty and proximate cause, and that there is (often confusing) overlap between the
two elements. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 683-84, 686 A.2d 636, 638
(1996). The court explained that the issue of foreseeability affected both duty and proxi-
mate cause equally and should therefore be considered in both contexts. Id. at 684, 686
A.2d at 638; cf. AndrewJ. McClurg, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent Storage
of Firearms, 32 CONN. L. REv. 1189, 1226 (2000) (describing foreseeability as the "damnable,
murky companion" of duty and proximate cause).
37. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
38. Id. at 100.
39. See Henley v. Prince George's County, 305 Md. 320, 333-34, 503 A.2d 1333, 1340
(1986) (tracing the origin of Maryland's foreseeability doctrine to Judge Cardozo's opin-
ion in Palsgraj).
40. 335 Md. 58, 642 A.2d 180 (1994).
41. Id. at 62-63, 642 A.2d at 182. In Rosenblatt, the plaintiff advanced four theories on
which the defendant could be liable for allegedly contaminating the property-strict liabil-
ity, negligence, trespass, and nuisance-but only the negligence theory is discussed as rele-
vant here. See id.
42. Id. at 76, 642 A.2d at 188-89.
43. Id. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189.
44. See Henley, 305 Md. at 333-34, 503 A.2d at 1340 ("[Alt least since 1928 when Judge
Cardozo wrote Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., courts have given further effect to the social
policy of limitation of liability for remote consequences . . . ." (citation omitted)).
[VOL. 60:441
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The Rosenblatt court also explained that inherent in the foresee-
ability analysis is the concept of a relationship between the parties out
of which a duty arises.4 5 While traditional privity-the direct connec-
tion between parties to a contract-is not required to establish that
relationship,4 6 at the very least, the plaintiff must be related to the
defendant in such a way that the defendant could reasonably foresee
that his or her tortious conduct would likely harm the plaintiff.47 This
relationship requirement has spawned the belief that a tort duty will
only be found in favor of "identifiable plaintiffs."4" This is true inas-
much as there will be cases where the identification of persons ex-
posed to increased risk of harm will be necessary in determining the
existence of a duty.49
However, the ability to precisely identify plaintiffs in advance will
not always be an absolute requirement to satisfy the foreseeability of
harm test. For example, in Henley v. Prince George's County,"° the Court
of Appeals considered an employer's liability for retaining an em-
ployee as a security guard after the employee had expressed an intent
to abuse suspected vandals.5 ' The court stated that employers have a
duty to refrain from employing unfit employees, and that the duty is
intended to protect all persons who might come in contact with the
employee.5 2 The fact that those persons cannot be readily identified
45. Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 77, 642 A.2d at 189.
46. Village of Cross Keys, Inc., v. United States Gypsum Co., 315 Md. 741, 753, 556 A.2d
1126, 1132 (quoting Council of Co-Owners Ad. Condo., Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Con-
tracting Co., 308 Md. 18, 32, 517 A.2d 336, 343 (1986)).
47. Henley, 305 Md. at 333-34, 503 A.2d at 1340.
48. See id. (explaining that "identifiable plaintiffs" are "those within a foreseeable zone
of danger whose identities are known in advance").
49. Id. The Henley court illustrated this idea by contrasting Tarasoff v. Regents of the
University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976), with Thompson v. County of Alameda, 614
P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980). See Henley, 305 Md. at 334-36, 503 A.2d at 1340-41. In Tarasoff a
patient informed his psychologist of his intent to kill a particular person. Tarasoff 551 P.2d
at 339. In Thompson, a juvenile delinquent notified his custodians of his intent to kill a
young child in his neighborhood. Thompson, 614 P.2d at 730. The existence of a duty in
both cases turned on the feasibility of identifying the plaintiff. See Henley, 305 Md. at 334,
503 A.2d at 1340. In Tarasoff where the patient identified his intended victim by name,
the court held that the psychologist had a duty to warn the victim. Tarasoff 551 P.2d at
345. However, in Thompson, the juvenile gave no specific details about the identity of his
victim, and the court held that his custodians had no duty to warn the general public.
Thompson, 614 P.2d at 735.
50. 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986).
51. Id. at 330, 503 A.2d at 1338.
52. Id. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341. The Henley court relied on Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md.
160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978), and Cramerv. Housing Opportunities Commission, 304 Md. 705, 501
A.2d 35 (1985). In Evans, the Court of Appeals considered whether the owner of a tavern
could be held liable for injuries sustained by a bar patron who had been shot by an em-
ployee. Evans, 284 Md. at 161-64, 395 A.2d at 481-82. The court explained that "[w]here
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in advance does not mean that they are not included in the class pro-
tected by the employer's duty.53
There are several other factors that must be considered in addi-
tion to the foreseeability of harm and the relationship between the
parties when deciding whether a defendant owes a plaintiff a legal
duty. In Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County,54 the Court of Appeals ap-
proved the criteria and analysis employed by the California Supreme
Court in Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California.55 The Califor-
nia court had explained that, when analyzing the existence of a duty,
it is necessary to consider the connection between the defendant's
conduct and the injury, the "moral blame" attached to the defen-
dant's conduct, the need to prevent future harm, the burden on the
defendant created by the duty, the cost and availability of liability in-
surance, and the consequences to the community of imposing the
duty.56 Ultimately, the court must decide whether to impose a duty
on a party "by weighing the various policy considerations and reach-
ing a conclusion that the plaintiffs interests are, or are not, entitled to
legal protection. 57
C. Duty to Control Third Persons
Identifying an actionable duty is particularly problematic when
the defendant is not the direct cause of the harm, but instead facili-
tates the wrongful conduct of a third person. In Scott v. Watson,59
the Court of Appeals held that an individual has no duty to protect
another from the criminal acts of a third person, except where there
an employee is expected to come into contact with the public... the employer must make
some reasonable inquiry before hiring or retaining the employee." Id. at 166-67, 395 A.2d
at 484. However, the court held that this standard did not require the tavern owner to
inquire into the employee's criminal background. Id. at 167, 395 A.2d at 484.
The court revisited the issue of negligent hiring and retention in Cramer. The Cramer
court examined whether a public housing agency could be held liable for injuries to one of
its tenants resulting from a rape committed by a housing inspector employed by the
agency. Cramer, 304 Md. at 707-08, 501 A.2d at 36-37. Relying on Evans, the court held
that the agency owed the tenant a duty of reasonable care in hiring a housing inspector.
Id. at 711-13, 501 A.2d at 38-39.
53. Henley, 305 Md. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341.
54. 306 Md. 617, 510 A.2d 1078 (1986).
55. Id. at 627, 510 A.2d at 1083 (quoting Tarasoff 551 P.2d at 342). Ashburn's adoption
of the Tarasoff factors was later recognized in Village of Cross Keys v. United States Gypsum Co.,
315 Md. 741, 752, 556 A.2d 1126, 1131 (1989).
56. Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627, 510 A.2d at 1083 (quoting Tarasoff, 551 P.2d at 342).
57. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 77, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994) (citing KEETON
ET AL., supra note 32, § 53, at 357-58.
58. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 685, 686 A.2d 636, 639 (1996).
59. 278 Md. 160, 359 A.2d 548 (1976).
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is a special relationship between the parties or where a statute creates
such a duty.6 ° The Scott holding is consistent with the rule governing
the duty to control third persons set forth in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.
6 1
The rationale for this doctrine is based on the proposition that,
generally, individuals in society may proceed on the assumption that
others will obey the criminal law. 62 A duty to control third party
wrongdoers will only be imposed where the defendant has a special
duty to protect the plaintiff.63 Absent these special circumstances, a
defendant will not be required to control the conduct of a third per-
son, even if he could do so with trivial effort and without
inconvenience. 64
D. Similar Negligence Cases in Other Jurisdictions
In 1994, the Ohio Court of Appeals decided Pavlides v. Niles Gun
Show, Inc.,65 a case in which firearms were stolen from a gun show by
unsupervised minors who subsequently used the guns in an attempted
murder.66 The victim brought suit against the operator of the gun
show, asserting that the defendant owed the general public a duty to
60. Id. at 166, 359 A.2d at 552.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) states:
There is no duty so to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him
from causing physical harm to another unless
(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes
a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection.
Id. In Lamb v. Hopkins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985), the Court of Appeals examined
the provisions of Section 315 in detail, declaring that the Scott decision "implicitly ap-
proved the analytical framework embodied within that section." Id. at 245, 492 A.2d at
1302; see also Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., 335 Md. 135, 150-51, 642
A.2d 219, 227 (1994) (finding that the state had no duty to prevent a patient who had
escaped from a state mental facility from injuring another motorist in a car accident);
Ashburn, 306 Md. at 628, 510 A.2d at 1083 (finding that a police officer had no duty to
prevent an allegedly drunk driver from injuring a pedestrian); Furr v. Spring Grove State
Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 486, 454 A.2d 414, 420 (1983) (finding that a psychiatrist owed no
duty to the public to prevent harm caused by his failure to detain his patient).
62. KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, § 33, at 201.
63. Lamb, 303 Md. at 242, 492 A.2d at 1300. In Lamb, the court referred to sections
316-319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for examples of some situations that might give
rise to such a duty: parent-child relationships, master-servant relationships, the relation-
ship between a possessor of land and a licensee, and cases where one person is in charge of
another person having dangerous propensities. Id. at 242-43, 492 A.2d at 1300-01.
64. Id. at 242 & n.4, 492 A.2d at 1300 & n.4.
65. 637 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994).
66. Id. at 406-07.
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prevent third parties from stealing firearms from gun show vendors.67
The trial court concluded that, as a matter of law, no such duty exists
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.6" The ap-
pellate court reversed and remanded, holding that the gun show oper-
ator could have reasonably foreseen the theft.6 9
The Court of Appeals of Texas considered the duty to control
third persons in Berly v. D & L Security Services and Investigations, Inc.70
In Berly, a store employee was shot and killed by a shoplifter who was
being pursued by a security guard employed by the defendant. 7 1 The
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against the security service,
alleging that the guard had failed to protect store employees from the
shoplifter and that the guard had used improper procedures in appre-
hending the shoplifter.72 The court found that "violent crime has be-
come a significant and pervasive social problem," and that the
common law must adapt to changing social conditions. 73 The case
was remanded so that the genuine issues of material fact regarding
the security service's duty to protect store employees from armed
shoplifters could be resolved. 4
In Estate of Strever v. Cline,75 a 1996 Montana case, four minors
stole a gun from the defendant's unlocked truck.76 One of the mi-
nors accidentally shot and killed another with the gun.77 The Su-
preme Court of Montana held that the defendant not only owed a
duty to store his gun in a safe and reasonable manner from the minor
boys, but he also owed that duty "to the public in general. ' 78 How-
67. Id. at 407. In Pavlides, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendants, the operators and
promoters of the gun show, "had a duty to protect the general public from unlawful acts of
third parties who may steal guns from independent vendors and subsequently injure a
member of the general public." Id. The plaintiffs further asserted that the defendants
breached this duty by "allowing unsupervised minors into the gun show, allowing weapons
to be displayed without properly securing same from theft, permitting the independent
vendors to sell weapons and/or ammunition to minors, and in not establishing and enforc-
ing strict safety and security measures." Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 410.
70. 876 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994).
71. Id. at 180-81.
72. Id. at 181.
73. Id. at 188.
74. Id.
75. 924 P.2d 666 (Mont. 1996).
76. Id. at 668.
77. Id. The minor who was in possession of the gun at the time of the gun's discharge
had been smoking marijuana prior to the incident. Id.
78. Id. at 669. Montana has imposed a statutory duty on each of its citizens to act with
ordinary care for the benefit of every other member of the general public:
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ever, despite the existence of that duty, the court held that the defen-
dant's breach was not the proximate cause of the minor's death.7 9
III. THE COURT'S REASONING
In Valentine v. On Target, Inc., the Court of Appeals held that a
gun store owner did not owe a duty "to third parties to exercise rea-
sonable care in the display and sale of handguns to prevent the theft
and the illegal use of the handguns by others against third parties.""°
However, the court cautioned that its holding should not be inter-
preted to mean that a gun merchant may never be held liable for the
negligent display and sale of handguns.8 "
Writing for the majority, Judge Karwacki began the court's analy-
sis by discussing the policy supporting the negligence cause of ac-
tion. 2 He explained that the cause of action is intended to
discourage or encourage certain types of behavior by one party for the
benefit of another party. 3 However, before the law will recognize a
party's duty to behave in a particular fashion, or to refrain from partic-
ular behavior, the duty must have a cognizable benefit to the
plaintiff.8 4
Except as otherwise provided by law, everyone is responsible not only for the re-
sults of his willful acts but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of
ordinary care or skill in the management of his property or person except so far
as the latter has willfully or by want of ordinary care brought the injury upon
himself.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-701 (1999). "Every person is bound, without contract, to abstain
from injuring the person or property of another or infringing upon any of his rights." Id.
§ 28-1-201. Under these statutes, the determination of duty turns not on "the status of the
injured party but [on] the exercise of ordinary care in the circumstances." Limberhand v.
Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491, 496 (Mont. 1985).
79. Estate of Strever, 924 P.2d at 671-72.
80. Valentine, 353 Md. at 546-47, 727 A.2d at 948. Judge Karwacki wrote the opinion for
the majority and Judges Rodowsky, Chasanow, and Smith joined. See id. at 544, 546, 727
A.2d at 947, 948.
81. Id. at 556, 727 A.2d at 953. The court explained:
We caution that the holding in this case does not mean that a gun store owner
may never be held liable to another party for negligence in the display and sale of
guns when that other party is injured as a result of the negligence but rather that
under the specific facts alleged in this particular case no duty was owed to this
petitioner's decedent.
I&.
82. Id at 550, 727 A.2d at 950.
83. Id. The majority explained that the purpose of negligence is embodied in the first
element of the cause of action-"that the defendant had a duty to act to the benefit of the
plaintiff." Id.
84. See id. ("If the creation of a duty has no benefit to the plaintiff then the purpose is
defeated."). In its examination of duty doctrine, the majority omitted any cost-benefit
analysis, a factor which was considered by the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in the
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The majority then analyzed whether On Target owed Joanne Val-
entine any such duty and evaluated the facts with respect to the fore-
seeability of harm and the relationship between the parties."
Regarding the foreseeability of harm, the majority found that the
Plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts to show that On Target could
have foreseen the theft of handguns from its store, or the murder of
Joanne Valentine.16 The court concluded that Plaintiffs argument
would require imposing a duty on the defendant "based solely on an
imprecise notion of a foreseeability of risk of harm to the public in
general."87
Upon considering the relationship between the parties, the ma-
jority declared that "[o]ne cannot be expected to owe a duty to the
world at large to protect it against the actions of third parties."" The
court determined that, under these facts, the class of potential plain-
tiffs would be too large and indeterminate, and therefore it would be
inappropriate to impose such a duty on the defendant.8 9
The majority continued by distinguishing Valentine from several
cases in other jurisdictions in which defendants were found to have
had a duty to the general public.90 The first case considered was Pav-
lides v. Niles Gun Show, Inc.91 The Valentine majority found Pavlides fac-
tually distinguishable, pointing to the fact that the complaint in
Pavlides alleged specific facts which showed that the defendant's expe-
rience with thefts from prior gun shows made harm to the plaintiff
foreseeable.92 The court then examined Berly v. D & L Security Services
Valentine case. See Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 685, 686 A.2d 636, 639
(1996). The Court of Special Appeals explained that the burden of a proposed duty to
both the defendant and the community must be weighed against the social benefit of im-
posing such a duty to prevent future harm. Id
85. Valentine, 353 Md. at 550-51, 727 A.2d at 950; see supra notes 36-49 and accompany-
ing text (discussing foreseeability of harm and a relationship between the parties as re-
quirements for a legally cognizable duty).
86. Valentine, 353 Md. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951. However, by the court's own opinion in Lamb v. Hop-
kins, 303 Md. 236, 492 A.2d 1297 (1985), this reasoning may be superfluous. In Lamb, the
court was faced with a similar proposition as in Valentine-that the defendant should owe a
duty to "'anyone, readily identifiable or not, who, as a result of the failure to exercise due
care ... is foreseeably harmed.'" Id. at 253, 492 A.2d at 1306. The Lamb court refused to
address the issue, declaring that "a duty must first exist before a court can determine to
whom the duty is owed." Id.
89. Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951.
90. Id. at 553-56.
91. 637 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 65-69
(providing a summary of Pavlides).
92. Valentine, 353 Md. at 553-54, 727 A.2d at 951-52 (distinguishing Valentine from Pav-
lides). In Pavlides, there was evidence in the record indicating that one of the defendants
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and Investigations, Inc.93 The majority found Berly "factually inappo-
site" because in that case the security guard's actions partially created
the danger to which the decedent was exposed.94 The final case ana-
lyzed was Estate of Strever v. Cline.95 The majority in Valentine flatly re-
jected Montana's policy that a person may owe a duty to the general
public, declaring that this kind of duty "is simply too foreign to [Mary-
land's] well-established jurisprudence to sufficiently advocate a differ-
ent result."96
In a separate opinion, Judge Raker, joined by Chief Judge Bell
and Judge Eldridge, concurred in the majority's judgment that the
trial court's dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint was appropriate.97 How-
ever, Judge Raker argued that portions of the majority opinion might
be misread as implicitly declaring gun merchants to be immune from
liability for negligent storage of their handgun inventory.98 She sug-
gested instead that the dismissal of Plaintiff's complaint should have
been affirmed solely on the basis that Plaintiff had failed to meet his
pleading burden.9
Rejecting the majority's conclusion that On Target could not
foresee the theft and criminal misuse of its handguns, Judge Raker
argued that the theft of an unsecured handgun, as well as the possibil-
ity that it will be used in a violent crime, is foreseeable.'00 Citing sev-
eral research studies about the use of stolen guns in the commission
of violent crimes, as well as elaborate federal and state statutory
schemes that regulate the transfer of firearms, Judge Raker concluded
that "policy concerns cry out loudly in favor of recognizing a duty to
the foreseeable plaintiff on the part of retail handgun sellers to exer-
"had knowledge that firearms had been stolen from previous gun shows at the Civic Center
and comprehended the risks associated with allowing minors who are unaccompanied by
an adult into a gun show." Pavlides, 637 N.E.2d at 409.
93. 876 S.W.2d 179 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 70-74 (pro-
viding a summary of Berly).
94. Valentine, 353 Md. at 554, 727 A.2d at 952. However, it is arguable that failing to
prevent the theft of handguns partially creates the danger of a subsequent murder commit-
ted with one of those guns.
95. 924 P.2d 666 (Mont. 1996); see supra text accompanying notes 75-79 (providing a
summary of Estate of Strever).
96. Valentine, 353 Md. at 555-56, 727 A.2d at 952.
97. Id. at 556, 727 A.2d at 953 (Raker, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 558, 727 A.2d at 954. Judge Raker described parts of the majority opinion as
being "painted... with too broad a brush," particularly "those parts of the opinion which
impliedly foreclose the possibility of a tort action based upon the negligence of a retail gun
merchant in the keeping, display, storage, or sale of handguns." Id. at 558, 556, 727 A.2d
at 954, 953.
99. Id. at 559, 727 A.2d at 954.
100. Id. at 561, 727 A.2d at 955.
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cise reasonable care in conducting their business so as to avoid the
theft and subsequent criminal misuse of handguns." °1
IV. ANALYSIS
Although the Valentine majority was correct in holding that Plain-
tiff had failed to plead the existence of a legal duty, the holding is
overshadowed by misleading dicta that suggests that there can be no
cognizable common law tort duty imposed upon gun merchants to
guard their inventory against theft. 102 In fact, Maryland's common
law supports charging gun merchants with a duty to safeguard dangerous
instrumentalities."0 3 Furthermore, it is feasible to allow a limited subset
of foreseeable, but not identifiable, plaintiffs to bring an action for negli-
gent storage when that duty is breached.10 4 The following Sections
will provide a rationale for adopting such a doctrine in Maryland.
A. The Issue in Valentine Was Essentially Procedural
The real issue before the court in Valentine was a procedural
one. 0 5 The majority was correct to conclude that, in the face of fac-
tual and legal complexity, Plaintiff failed to plead sufficient facts in his
101. Id. at 567, 727 A.2d at 958. To support her position that "it is well known that
stolen handguns are an important source of supply to the criminal population," Judge
Raker pointed out that "'at least four-tenths, and possibly as much as seven-tenths, of the
most recent handguns possessed by [convicts] were stolen weapons.'" Id. at 562, 727 A.2d
at 956 (quoting JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. Rossi, ARMED AND CONSIDERED DANGEROUS
207 (expanded ed. 1994)).
102. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951 ("This Court does not discern in the
common law the existence of a third party common law duty that would apply to these
facts."). Since the core issue in Valentine is the absence of facts, it is arguable that the trial
judge should have exercised his discretionary authority to dismiss the complaint with leave
to amend. See supra note 30 (discussing the authority of a trial judge to grant a plaintiff
leave to amend his complaint to cure any defects). In fact, the trial judge raised the issue
of amendment at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, suggesting that Plaintiff may have
wanted to amend his complaint. Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 23, E60,
Valentine (No. 95-22401.OC). Defense counsel responded, somewhat inaccurately, that "if
[the complaint] is dismissed, [Plaintiff] can't amend his pleading." Id. There is no further
mention of amendment in the hearing transcript. Furthermore, it is unclear why neither
appellate court was willing to remand the case with leave to amend.
103. See infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (explaining the basis for a duty to
safeguard dangerous instrumentalities).
104. See infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text (suggesting a method for defining a
limited class of plaintiffs in negligent storage actions).
105. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 559, 727 A.2d at 954 (Raker, J., concurring) ("I would
affirm the Court of Special Appeals on the very narrow ground that the complaint fails to
state any facts, beyond bald and conclusory allegations, that Respondent breached a duty
of due care to Petitioner in this case.").
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complaint to identify a duty owed by On Target to Joanne
Valentine.106
Valentine involved both a complex fact pattern and a novel legal
theory. The case was factually complex because of the high
probability of intervening circumstances. 10 7 The case also involved a
novel legal theory in Maryland-whether a gun store owes the general
public a duty to protect its inventory from theft and subsequent crimi-
nal misuse. 108 Such complexity, both factual and legal, requires speci-
ficity in pleading.0 9
In his complaint, Plaintiff merely asserted that On Target owed
every resident of Anne Arundel County a duty to exercise reasonable
care to protect its handgun inventory from theft and criminal mis-
use.110 However, Plaintiff failed to allege any facts that would have
provided a basis for recognizing such a duty. 1' The complaint pro-
vided no insight as to how On Target could have foreseen the theft of
the handguns, or the subsequent death of Joanne Valentine.1 2 The
lack of a relationship between the parties was not addressed in the
complaint, nor were any additional factors described as set forth in
Ashburn."3 Faced with such a complex case and only sparse factual
allegations, the court was correct in concluding that Plaintiff failed to
meet his burden of pleading."'
106. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.
107. Although it was clear that Joanne Valentine's killer was not Edward McLeod, the
shooter was never identified. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 682, 686
A.2d 636, 637 (1996). Two months elapsed between the time of the robbery and the time
Mrs. Valentine was shot, so it is possible that the stolen guns passed among several inter-
vening parties. Id.
108. At oral argument on On Target's motion to dismiss, the trial judge stated, in re-
sponse to Plaintiffs legal theory, "I think you may be creating law that's not here." Tran-
script of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 19, E56, Valentine (No. 95-22401.OC).
109. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
110. Plaintiffs Complaint at E3, Valentine (No. 95-22401.OC).
111. Valentine, 353 Md. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.
112. Id.
113. See Ashburn v. Anne Arundel County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083
(1986) (describing factors from Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976), that should be considered in determining the existence of a tort duty); see also
supra text accompanying note 56 (stating the factors discussed by the court in Ashburn).
114. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950 (stating that the plaintiff had not
alleged any facts to support his claim that On Target knew or should have known of the
risk that guns might be stolen from its establishment and used in a subsequent crime).
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B. A Proper Characterization of the Duty in Valentine and a Proposed
Framework for "Negligent Storage" Actions
Valentine is a problematic opinion because the majority strayed
from the procedural question at issue and ventured into dangerous
dicta that mischaracterized the real tort duty in the case.' 15 The ma-
jority was incorrect to frame the proposed duty as a duty to control the
conduct of a third person. 11 6 The problem in this case was not that
On Target failed to control Mrs. Valentine's murderer, a third person.
Rather, the problem was that On Target failed to prevent that third
person from obtaining the gun he used to commit a criminal act.
Put simply, unguarded guns present .a major risk of harm to law-
abiding citizens. 1 7 The tort system is intended to manage risks, but
the "duty to control third persons" method is doomed to failure in
unguarded gun cases."' 8 What is needed instead is a tort duty that
seeks to manage the real danger: the failure by a rightful possessor of
a gun to take reasonable precautions to prevent it from being ob-
tained by a criminal.'19
That duty would be described best as a duty to safeguard dangerous
instrumentalities.2 ' Unlike the duty to control third persons, the pro-
115. See, e.g., id at 556, 727 A.2d at 953 ("[A]lthough the inherent nature of guns sug-
gests that their use may likely result in serious personal injury or death to another this does
not create a duty of gun dealers to all persons who may be subject of the harm.").
116. See id. at 551-53, 727 A.2d at 950-51. In his analysis of Valentine, Professor McClurg
suggests that the majority "misapprehended the nature and scope of the duty and correla-
tive burden." McClurg, supra note 36, at 1241. By framing the duty "as one to protect the
'world at large' from criminals," he argues that the court created a "straw man easily
knocked down." Id. (quoting Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951).
117. See McClurg, supra note 36, at 1208-09 (providing statistical data indicating that
stolen guns are frequently used by criminals and concluding that "unsafely stored firearms
create a substantial, foreseeable risk that such guns will be stolen and used for criminal
purposes").
Professor McClurg's article provides a comprehensive picture of the dangers
presented by unsafely stored guns. See id. at 1190-1200 (supplying data from ten public
health studies showing the prevalence of unsecured firearms in America). In particular,
he identifies three major risks of harm: accidental shootings, adolescent suicides, and crim-
inal misuse of stolen guns. Id. at 1202. He argues that among those risks, "criminal misuse
of stolen guns is the largest risk created by negligent storage." Id. at 1215.
118. See id. at 1241 ("Certainly, a duty to protect the world at large from criminal ele-
ments would be a tremendous burden with only a small chance of successfully being
borne.").
119. Even pro-gun organizations, such as the National Rifle Association, recognize that
gun owners have a duty to store their firearms safely. Id. at 1190-91 (referring to informa-
tion gathered from the NRA Headquarters, A Parent's Guide to Gun Safety, available at http:/
/www.nrahq.org/safety/ education/guide.asp##parent (last visited Feb. 12, 2001)).
120. See Kimbler v. Stillwell, 717 P.2d 1223, 1227 (Or. Ct. App. 1986) ("A gun is a dan-
gerous instrumentality. Presumably, because it is, it calls for a greater degree of care in its
display than the display of clothing or boxes of cereal ...."). One potential counterargu-
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posed duty would not require gun stores to control what is done with
a gun after it leaves the premises. Instead, the merchant would be
required to control whether a gun leaves the premises at all.121 Con-
sidered in this context, Valentine becomes a case of negligent storage.122
ment to this proposition is that virtually any product could be considered a "dangerous
instrumentality" when placed in the wrong hands. For example, if Xsteals an unguarded
lawn mower from a garden store and uses it in an assault against his neighbor Y, should the
garden store be liable for the negligent storage of its lawn mowers? The distinction be-
tween handguns and lawn mowers is that there is no compelling evidence that lawn
mowers are frequently used in the commission of crimes. Evidence does exist, on the
other hand, that illegal guns pose a real threat to law-abiding citizens. If, in the hypotheti-
cal world in which X and Y live, lawn mowers presented the same danger that illegal guns
present in modern America, then the proposed duty would be equally appropriate.
121. Under this rule, tort law would be operating in a substantially similar fashion as the
federal statutory system, which requires licensed gun dealers to exercise control over
whether firearms leave their establishment. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(b) (1) (West 2000)
(prohibiting licensed dealers from selling firearms to persons who are under certain age
limits); id. § 922(d) (prohibiting licensed dealers from knowingly selling firearms to fugi-
tives from justice, unlawful users of controlled substances, or persons who are under felony
indictment); id. § 922(t) (prohibiting licensed dealers from transferring a firearm to a per-
son before completing a satisfactory background check through the national instant crimi-
nal background check system established under the Brady Handgun Violence Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 103, 107 Stat. 1536, 1541 (1993)). Had On Target failed to
comply with one of these statutes and sold Mrs. Valentine's murderer the gun he used to
kill her, it may have been liable on a negligence per se theory. See Pahanish v. Western
Trails, Inc., 69 Md. App. 342, 362, 517 A.2d 1122, 1132 (1986) (explaining that the breach
of a statutory duty may be considered evidence of negligence if the plaintiff is a member of
the class of persons the statute is intended to protect, if the injury is of the type that the
statute was intended to prevent, and if the plaintiff presents sufficient evidence to show
that the breach of the statutory duty was the proximate cause of the injury).
122. While the scope of this Note is limited to the Valentine case and arguments in favor
of imposing some tort liability on negligent gun merchants in Maryland, Professor Mc-
Clurg's article provides a more thorough discussion of the "duty to safeguard dangerous
instrumentalities," and the corresponding "negligent storage" action. Additionally, his arti-
cle is national in scope, examining negligent storage cases in several jurisdictions.
One case analyzed by McClurg bears a particular similarity to Valentine. See id at 1242
(discussing Kimbler v. Stillwell, 717 P.2d 1223 (Or. Ct. App. 1986)). In Kimbler, the Ore-
gon Court of Appeals permitted the plaintiff to maintain a wrongful death action against a
retail gun store. Kimbler, 717 P.2d at 1227. The case began when a thief broke into a gun
store, stole a shotgun and shells, and used the gun to murder the plaintiffs son. Id, at
1224. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs second amended complaint for failure to
state a claim for which relief could be granted. Id. The Court of Appeals of Oregon re-
versed and remanded, finding that "[pilaintiff's pleadings allege facts sufficient to state a
claim that defendant did not meet the standard of care commensurate with a merchant's duty
to display merchandise in a safe manner." Id at 1227 (emphasis added). Admittedly, the legal
theory in Kimbler is more akin to premises liability than it is to pure negligence. However,
Kimbler suggests that it is not unreasonable to impose liability on gun merchants who fail to
properly guard their inventory. "Liability would arise, not from the fact that guns are dis-
played, but rather from proof that it was unreasonable for defendant to display guns and
ammunition in the manner in which it did." Id But see Buchler v. Or. Corr. Div., 853 P.2d
798, 804-06 (Or. 1993) (criticizing the Kimbler opinion for suggesting that anyone who
facilitates the commission of a crime may be civilly liable).
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C. Risk-Utility Analysis as a Basis for the Duty, and Why the Valentine
Majority Got the Risk-Utility Analysis Wrong
Negligence doctrine exists to manage situations involving unrea-
sonable risk.'2 3 Consequently, when an action in negligence is pro-
posed as a remedy for particular conduct, the necessary first step is
examining whether the risk involved in that conduct is "unreasona-
ble."' 24 A commonly accepted benchmark for measuring unreasona-
ble risk is the risk-utility test set out in Judge Learned Hand's opinion
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co.1 25
In Carroll Towing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
ond Circuit considered a barge owner's duty to post an attendant on a
barge to ensure that it did not drift from its moorings and damage
other vessels. 126 Judge Hand explained that the barge owner's duty
was a function of three variables: the probability of harm, the gravity
of the resulting injury, and the burden of adequate precautions. 27
Under this rubric, often called the "Learned Hand Formula," the
gravity of the resulting injury is multiplied by the probability of harm
and compared with the burden of precautions. 12' Liability will be im-
posed when the burden of precaution is less than the probability of
serious harm. 
129
Valentine is very similar to Carroll Towing. In both cases, the impo-
sition of a legal duty on the defendant rests, in part, on an analysis of
the benefits and corresponding burdens of the proposed duty. 3° Ex-
tendingJudge Hand's formula to Valentine, the risk-utility question be-
comes: Does the burden of preventing handgun theft outweigh the benefit of
preventing fatal crimes committed with stolen handguns?
When the facts of Valentine are examined under this new negli-
gent-storage risk-utility model, the flaws in the majority's benefit-bur-
123. See McClurg, supra note 36, at 1200-01 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra note 32, § 31).
124. See id.
125. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); see McClurg, supra note 36, at 1201 (discussing Carroll
Towing and Judge Hand's risk-utility analysis). Maryland courts, however, have never ex-
pressly endorsed Judge Hand's risk-utility test.
126. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171-74.
127. Id. at 173.
128. Id. Often expressed algebraically, the formula is P x L > B with P representing the
probability of harm, L the gravity of the resulting injury, and B the burden of adequate
precautions. See, e.g., id.; McClurg, supra note 36, at 1201.
129. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173.
130. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 550, 727 A.2d at 950 ("The purpose [of a cause of action
for negligence] is to discourage or encourage specific types of behavior by one party to the
benefit of another party.... If the creation of a duty has no benefit to the plaintiff then
the purpose is defeated.").
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den analysis are exposed.13 Considering the "benefit" side of the
equation, the Valentine majority intimates that placing such a duty on
gun store owners would have no benefit to the prospective plaintiff.13 2
However, if the tort system functions as intended, the prospect of seri-
ous financial liability will deter gun dealers from carelessly storing
their inventory.133 Threatened by financial liability, On Target may
have taken additional precautions to prevent Edward McLeod and his
companion from stealing handguns from the store. Although it is im-
possible to state with certainty that On Target could have prevented
Joanne Valentine's murder, she surely would have enjoyed better odds
had On Target taken greater care to prevent the theft of the weapon
that ultimately killed her.1 34 There is no doubt that improved chances
of staying alive would have constituted a substantial benefit to Joanne
Valentine.
Suggesting that such a benefit is outweighed by its corresponding
burden, the Valentine majority claimed that the proposed duty would
place a "tremendous burden on [gun] shop owners," but the court
did not provide any real analysis of the burden and did not explain
131. The Valentine majority makes only passing references to "burdens" and "benefits,"
but, in fact, these are critical components in a duty analysis. In the Court of Special Ap-
peals's Valentine decision, Judge Wilner explained that when ascertaining the existence of a
legal duty, "there is ... a cost/benefit ratio to consider-the burden to both the defendant
and the community of imposing the duty weighed against the social benefit of imposing
the duty as a means of preventing future harm." Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md.
App. 679, 685, 686 A.2d 636, 639 (1996). Not only did the Court of Appeals's majority
opinion provide an insufficient cost-benefit analysis, it also failed to address any of the
other issues that the court had declared as necessary criteria in Ashburn v. Anne Arundel
County, 306 Md. 617, 627, 510 A.2d 1078, 1083 (1986). See supra notes 54-57 and accompa-
nying text. The Valentine majority did not address "'the moral blame attached to the de-
fendant's conduct,'" nor did it consider "'the availability, cost and prevalence of insurance
for the risk involved.'" Ashburn, 306 Md. at 627, 510 A.2d at 1083 (quoting Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 342 (Cal. 1976)). However, these factors do
appear in Judge Raker's concurring opinion in Valentine. Valentine, 353 Md. at 563, 727
A.2d at 956 (Raker, J., concurring).
132. Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951 (claiming that the proposed duty would
provide "only a hypothetical benefit to the public at best").
133. See id. at 565, 727 A.2d at 957 (Raker, J., concurring) ("[Gun] dealers faced with
the prospect of liability in tort for negligent storage of handguns will be more careful in
the storage of those guns held out for sale to the general public."); see also McClurg, supra
note 36, at 1233 ("With the imposition of liability for harm inflicted by stolen guns, one
can predict insurance companies would step into the picture with restrictions that would
enhance the deterrent impact of liability on unsafe storage practices.").
134. See infra notes 151-152 and accompanying text (describing data gathered by the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, indicating the prevalence of use of stolen hand-
guns in criminal activities).
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why the burden would be "tremendous." ' In fact, when examined
logically, the burden is quite minimal.
In his article, Armed and Dangerous: Tort Liability for the Negligent
Storage of Firearms, Professor Andrew McClurg provides a three-
pronged framework for analyzing the burden of safe firearms stor-
age.' 36 First, it is necessary to consider the financial investment re-
quired to store firearms safely.13 7 Second, the inconvenience of
having to unlock guns for use must be examined.13 8 Finally, one must
consider whether safety procedures will impair the firearm's utility as
a self-defense tool. 139 The burden of safe storage is the sum of these
three components. 4 °
The inconvenience of safety measures, as Professor McClurg
points out, is too minor to justify serious consideration in any "negli-
gent storage" analysis.' 4 ' The self-defense component is basically ir-
relevant in the context of retail gun sales because firearms displayed
for retail sale are not intended for use by store employees in self-de-
fense-they are stored for the purpose of sale. Gun store employees,
like those who were working at On Target on the day of the theft, may
carry their own sidearms for personal protection. 42
The majority of the burden on gun merchants derives from the
financial investment required to store firearms in a safe manner.'4 3
Gun storage requires essentially the same security measures as em-
ployed by other retail establishments-alarms, locked display cases,
barred windows, and so on. 1 44 The cost of these measures is no
135. Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951.
136. McClurg, supra note 36, at 1209-14.
137. Id. at 1209-11.
138. Id. at 1211-12.
139. Id. at 1212-14.
140. Id. at 1209.
141. Id at 1212.
142. Generally, carrying a firearm is prohibited in Maryland. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 36B(b) (1996). However, Maryland law expressly permits certain employees to carry fire-
arms within the confines of their workplaces. See id. § 36B(c) (4) ("Nothing in this section
shall prevent a supervisory employee from wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun
within the confines of a business establishment in which he is employed during such time
as he is acting in the course of his employment .... ."); see also Transcript of Hearing on
Motion to Dismiss at 10, E47, Valentine (No. 95-22401.OC) ("[E]mployees of the Defendant
who are engaged in the sale of these handguns on a daily basis arm themselves with loaded
handguns strapped to their person because of the fear of thefts .... ).
143. See McClurg, supra note 36, at 1210 n.164 ("The required financial investment for
safe storage will increase . . .proportionately to the number of guns being stored ....
Those responsible for safeguarding large stockpiles of weapons, such as gun dealers ...
obviously would be expected to invest much more in safety. .. ").
144. Cf id at 1229 (explaining that guns are "small, inanimate, easily securable items
that can be controlled efficiently and effectively").
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greater for gun merchants than it is for the seller of any other retail
good.'45 Moreover, gun stores can certainly afford these costs. Ac-
cording to firearms industry data, revenues from new handgun sales
in the United States are roughly a half billion dollars per year. 46
Imposing a duty on gun stores to take reasonable, financially via-
ble steps to protect their inventory from theft hardly creates the tre-
mendous burden that the Valentine majority suggests, 4 ' especially
when one considers the economic strength of the industry. In the
context of Judge Hand's cost-benefit formula, the burden of prevent-
ing handgun theft is minimal in comparison to the probability that a
stolen handgun will be used to commit a violent crime.
D. The Valentine Majority's Foreseeability Analysis Is Faulty
The Valentine majority asserted that the proposed duty is inappro-
priate because it is "based solely on an imprecise notion of a foresee-
ability of risk of harm to the public in general."' 48 However, there is
nothing imprecise about the risk of theft and subsequent criminal
misuse in the sale of handguns.'49
Empirical evidence shows that stolen firearms are frequently used
in violent crimes.150 For example, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco &
Firearms (ATF) reported that during 1996 and 1997, entities holding
federal firearms licenses reported 5041 gun thefts involving 24,697
guns.15 1 In 1999, after three years of analysis, the ATF released a re-
port indicating that one out of every three guns used in violent crimes
145. Sellers of many valuable commodities must implement strict security procedures.
Consider, for example, jewelers, pawn shops, and banks. For these merchants, effective
security is simply another cost of doing business. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 208.61 (2000) (man-
dating that banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System implement appropriate
security measures); THE JEWELERS' SEC. ALLIANCE, Crime Prevention Bulletin: Jewelers Can Stop
"Three Minute Burglaries," available at http://jsa.polygon.net/trade/crimeprev-bulletins/
threeminute.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2001) (explaining that jewelry stores should use
locked cabinets, safes, metal grates over windows, proper lighting, and video surveillance
systems to prevent theft); UNION LIFE & CAS. INS. AGENCY, Specialized Pawnbrokers Insurance
Program, available at http://www.pawnins.com/ulccover.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 2001)
(stating that pawnbrokers must implement a central alarm system and adequate safe pro-
tection to qualify for pawnbrokers' insurance).
146. See NAT'L Ass'N OF FEDERALLY LICENSED FIREARMs DEALERS, Firearms Sales, available at
http://www.amfire.com/afistatistics/firesales.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2000).
147. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951.
148. Id. at 551, 727 A.2d at 950.
149. Cf McClurg, supra note 36, at 1236 (explaining that when judges conclude that the
theft and criminal misuse of guns is not foreseeable, it is often because they feel "it is
undesirable to impose liability in such cases").
150. See id. at 1207-09 (providing statistics regarding the prevalence of gun theft and the
criminal misuse of stolen guns).
151. Id. at 1207 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, 1997 ATF ANNUAL REP. 19 (1997)).
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in selected cities had been stolen from private residences or gun deal-
ers. t52 There is even evidence in this case that On Target may have
known that guns from its inventory were used in a disproportionate
number of homicides in the Baltimore area.1 53
This evidence compels the conclusion that the risk of criminal
misuse of stolen handguns is foreseeable. However, this conclusion
holds only that the harm itself is foreseeable. Under the traditional
"foreseeability of harm" analysis, there must also be some relationship
between the parties that gives rise to the duty.' 5 4 The Valentine major-
ity clearly saw this issue as a major hurdle to holding On Target liable
forJoanne Valentine's murder. 15 5 The court's own reasoning in Hen-
ley v. Prince George's County156 provides a way to clear the hurdle. In
Henley, the court declared that an employer had a duty to refrain from
employing an unfit worker.157 In that case, the court reasoned that
the duty was intended to protect all members of the public who might
reasonably come into contact with the unfit employee.15 ' Therefore,
the fact that plaintiffs could not be readily identified in advance did
not bar those plaintiffs from maintaining an action against the em-
ployer, so long as they were within the class of persons who might
reasonably come in contact with the unfit employee. 159
The facts of Valentine are analogous to Henley. On Target's pro-
posed duty, as re-characterized in this Note, is a duty to safeguard dan-
gerous instrumentalities. The purpose of imposing that duty is to
prevent criminals from easily obtaining handguns, and thus to protect
the public from the potential violent acts of those criminals. Both
Valentine and Henley involve a duty that is intended to protect the pub-
152. Id. at 1208 (citing Debbi Wilgoren, Report Traces Guns Used in Crimes; D.C. Offenders
Increasingly Getting Weapons from Beyond Area, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1999, at Bi). To this
point, Judge Raker stated in her concurring opinion that "the theft of a handgun, left
unsecured and easily accessible, is foreseeable, as is the definitive possibility that a stolen
handgun will be used in violent crime." Valentine, 353 Md. at 561, 727 A.2d at 955 (Raker,
J., concurring).
153. SeeTranscript of Hearing on Motion to Dismiss at 14-15, E51-E52, Valentine (No. 95-
22401.OC) ("[On Target] was identified as the sixth largest distributor of guns used in
homicides in Baltimore, Maryland in an A.T.F. examination of all the guns stores in the
greater metropolitan Washington/Baltimore area .. .
154. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
155. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951 ("The class of persons to whom a duty
would be owed under these bare facts would encompass an indeterminate class of people,
known and unknown.").
156. 305 Md. 320, 503 A.2d 1333 (1986).
157. Id. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341 (citing Cramer v. Hous. Opportunities Comm'n, 304
Md. 705, 501 A.2d 35 (1985); Evans v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 395 A.2d 480 (1978)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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lic. Therefore, following the court's own logic from Henley, members
of the public who might reasonably come in contact with guns stolen
from a retail gun merchant should be able to maintain a negligence
action against that merchant. As in Henley, the fact that those plain-
tiffs are not identifiable in advance is irrelevant. 160
In this regard, the Henley opinion provides a strong rebuttal to
the Valentine majority's concern that gun merchants would owe a duty
to the "world at large.1 61 Applying the logic from Henley, the duty
owed by gun merchants is limited to persons who might reasonably come
into contact with one of the stolen guns.1 62 Defining that class of potential
plaintiffs cannot be achieved with a bright-line rule, but instead re-
quires case-by-case examination. 163 However, when the victim and
gun store are both located in the same county, as in Valentine,1 64 it is a
fair conclusion that the victim might reasonably come in contact with
the stolen gun.
Viewed in light of both statistical evidence showing that the crimi-
nal misuse of stolen handguns is foreseeable, and existing Maryland
case law allowing tort duties to expand beyond "identifiable plaintiffs,"
the Valentine majority's conclusion that the criminal misuse of a stolen
handgun is not foreseeable as a matter of law is patently incorrect.1 65
160. See id.
161. Valentine, 353 Md. at 553, 727 A.2d at 951.
162. See Henley, 305 Md. at 336, 503 A.2d at 1341. Admittedly, not all "contact" with the
stolen gun gives rise to an actionable negligence case. For example, Joanne Valentine
might have come in contact with the stolen gun if she had discovered it abandoned in the
gutter near her house.
163. In Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., the court pointed out that determining the existence of a
legal duty is a question of law for the trialjudge. 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 189 (1994).
In cases involving the negligent storage of firearms, the question of whether the victim
might reasonably come in contact with the stolen gun will simply become one criterion of
many that the trial judge will have to evaluate in determining the existence of a legal duty.
Answering that question can be no more difficult than wading through the existing web of
foreseeability doctrine.
164. On Target is located in Severn, Maryland, a community in Anne Arundel County.
Joanne Valentine was murdered outside her home in Anne Arundel County.
165. See Valentine, 353 Md. at 561, 727 A.2d at 955 (Raker, J., concurring) ("I ... disa-
gree with the majority's conclusion that, as a matter of law, neither the theft nor the crimi-
nal misuse of the firearm was foreseeable."). One potential counterargument to this
conclusion is that, generally, the intervening acts of third parties sever the chain of causa-
tion necessary for a finding of negligence. Id at 566, 727 A.2d at 957. However, if the
intervening act was foreseeable, it will not negate the original negligent actor's liability. Id.
(citing Matthews v. Amberwood, 351 Md. 544, 578-79, 719 A.2d 119, 135-36 (1998)). As it
is necessary to prove the foreseeability of subsequent criminal misuse to establish the prima
facie case for negligence, that foreseeability will also serve to negate an "intervening third
party" defense. See id.
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V. CONCLUSION
Valentine could have been resolved on a relatively simple procedu-
ral basis-that Plaintiffs complaint failed to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. 166 Although the majority's holding on that
core procedural issue was correct, it was overshadowed by dicta that
provided a flawed risk-utility analysis. The opinion also ignored im-
portant precedent and generally runs contrary to modem public
policy.
As the Court of Special Appeals observed, extending a gun store's
liability to the general public on the well-pleaded facts of Valentine
would have inappropriately created a doctrine of absolute liability. 167
However, it would be equally inappropriate to create a doctrine of
absolute immunity for gun dealers. In a world where gun violence is
an increasing threat, no community is safe if its gun merchants make
weapons available to criminals.
The time has come for Maryland to recognize a common law ac-
tion for negligent storage of firearms. 168 A negligent storage action
which requires gun merchants to exercise reasonable care for the ben-
efit of their community is adequately supported by both cost-benefit
and foreseeability arguments. 169 Moreover, as Judge Raker stated in
her concurring opinion in Valentine, "policy concerns cry out loudly in
favor" of requiring gun stores to exercise reasonable care to protect
the members of their communities. 170
MICHAEL T. PEDONE
166. See id. at 559, 727 A.2d at 954 (disagreeing with the majority's broad holding and
explaining that the case could have been decided "on the very narrow ground that the
complaint fails to state any facts . . . that Respondent breached a duty of care to
Petitioner").
167. Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 112 Md. App. 679, 691, 686 A.2d 636, 641 (1996). But
see supra note 102 (arguing that the plaintiff should have been granted leave to amend the
complaint).
168. But see Valentine, 353 Md. at 556, 727 A.2d at 953 ("If we would hold today that gun
merchants owe an indefinite duty to the general public effectively we would be regulating
the merchants. This type of regulation is the realm of the legislature and is not appropri-
ate as a judicial enactment."). Judge Karwacki is correct inasmuch as the imposition of an
"indefinite duty" would be an inappropriate regulatory act. However, when Valentine is
viewed in the much narrower context of negligent firearms storage proposed in this Note,
it is a case in which the tort system can function effectively and appropriately.
169. See supra notes 123-165 and accompanying text (providing risk-utility and foresee-
ability rationales for a negligent storage doctrine).
170. 353 Md. at 567, 727 A.2d at 958 (1999) (Raker, J., concurring).
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